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‘Brexit’ in transnational perspective: an analysis of newspapers in France, Germany and 
the Netherlands1 
Patrick Bijsmans (Maastricht University), Charlotte Galpin (University of Birmingham / 
University of Copenhagen), Benjamin Leruth (University of Canberra) 
-Forthcoming in Comparative European Politics- 
Abstract: 
The Brexit vote of 23 June 2016 is expected to have a profound impact, not only on Britian 
itself, but also on the remaining twenty-seven member states of the European Union. This 
article looks at how the Brexit debate was perceived outside of Britain. Was there a sense of 
understanding for British concerns or was there rather a focus on maintaining unity in the face 
of British exceptionalism? Combining insights from European public sphere research and 
Euroscepticism research, we conduct a qualitative framing analysis of the discourse in leading 
centre-right newspapers in France, Germany and the Netherlands, as common ground with 
British Eurosceptics is most likely to be found here. Our analysis shows that initially there 
was some support for British calls for amending its relationship with the Union, in particular 
in Germany and the Netherlands. However, as the referendum drew nearer, the discourse 
shifted towards the need to maintain unity among the remaining member states. 
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Introduction 
                                               
1 We would like to thank the participants of the 2016 Annual UACES conference (London), 
the 2016 ESA RN 32 Midterm Conference (Brussels) and the 2016 Annual PCE conference 
(Maastricht) for their comments on earlier versions of this article. We are also grateful to the 
two anonymous reviewers for their constructive feedback. 
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On 23 June 2016 the British population voted for a British exit (‘Brexit’) from the European 
Union (EU) by a narrow majority of 52 per cent. Calls for a membership referendum date 
back to the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, when the Conservative Party’s split over the 
issue of Europe became deeply entrenched amid fears that the single currency would lead to 
the development of a federal EU (see Menon and Salter, 2016). Europe has long been seen as 
a ‘threat’ to the United Kingdom (UK), its significant other against which British identity has 
been constructed (e.g. Spiering, 2015). However, criticism and even rejection of European 
integration is no longer confined to the EU’s ‘awkward partner’ (George, 1990). From the 
Dutch and French ‘no’ to the European Constitution in 2005, to the rise of the Alternative für 
Deutschland (AfD; Alternative for Germany), Euroscepticism has increasingly become a 
mainstream phenomenon across Europe (Brack and Startin, 2015). The Euro and refugee 
crises have contributed to a politicisation of European integration and an increasing 
mobilisation of Eurosceptic movements that increasingly transcend national borders 
(FitzGibbon et al, 2017). In the wake of the referendum, fears about so-called ‘contagion’ to 
other countries have grown. 
This article compares how the Brexit debate was perceived in the public spheres of 
three of Britain’s strategic partners: France, Germany and the Netherlands. Eurosceptic 
movements in these countries – the National Front, the AfD, and the Party for Freedom – 
have gained influence since the 2014 European elections. Thus, the way in which Brexit is 
reflected in those member states becomes important. We define ‘public sphere’ as a ‘space’ 
for the exchange of information and opinions, in this case about EU affairs. It is widely 
believed that national media will continue to play an important role in fostering EU 
discourses (e.g. Risse, 2010). Hence, our research draws on an analysis of national 
newspapers. We ask to what extent the Brexit debate has a transnational dimension, that is, 
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whether there is a shared understanding of Brexit in our three countries. One the one hand, we 
consider whether the debate about Britain’s future relationship with the EU reflects similar 
needs and concerns in other member states. On the other hand, we examine whether the 
Brexit debate served to create a sense of unity amongst the other twenty-seven member states 
through understandings of shared risks and challenges associated with Brexit. 
Our analysis concentrates on four key events in the Brexit debate: David Cameron’s 
January 2013 speech at Bloomberg, during which he presented his plans to renegotiate 
Britain’s EU membership; the UK General Elections held on 5 May 2015; the referendum 
campaign, which started on 19 February 2016 when the EU and the UK reached agreement on 
a ‘renegotiated’ membership; as well as the immediate aftermath of the 23 June 2016 
referendum. We compare the newspapers’ coverage of the Brexit debate, combining insights 
from Euroscepticism research with those of public sphere research. As such, this article 
contributes to the ongoing debate on Euroscepticism and related calls for a focus that extends 
beyond political parties and public opinion (e.g. Usherwood and Startin, 2013). 
Simultaneously, it contributes to existing research on the possible contribution of 
Europeanised public spheres to EU democracy. 
 
Euroscepticism and the European public sphere 
 
The body of research on EU media coverage and the European public sphere has steadily 
increased since the 1990s (e.g. Risse, 2015; Statham and Trenz, 2013). Due to the limited 
scope of pan-European media, scholars have looked particularly into the possibilities of the 
development of a transnational European public sphere. From this perspective, a European 
public sphere develops not through pan-European media but through the Europeanisation of 
national public spheres, in which national media offer a platform for the debate of EU affairs 
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(see Risse, 2010). Europeanisation of public spheres happens as EU affairs become 
increasingly politicised and contested (Statham and Trenz, 2013). The volume of mass media 
coverage of EU affairs is rather substantial, in particular when European policies are 
considered to be controversial at the national level or when they are linked to certain events. 
For instance, one way in which the EU becomes politicised is through EU referendums, 
which can be considered political opportunity structures (Usherwood 2017; see also Statham 
and Trenz, 2013). Europeanisation can be measured according to a number of criteria, 
including visibility and inclusiveness of EU actors and communication between European and 
national actors (Koopmans and Statham, 2010). 
With regards to a potentially disruptive event such as Brexit, we would thus expect 
greater visibility of European actors and issues. Indeed, quantitative research by the European 
Journalism Observatory (2016) shows that media across Europe extensively covered the 
referendum. However, investigating the visibility of European actors in the public debates 
cannot tell us much about whether issues are understood in similar ways. A Europeanised 
public sphere is not just a question of issue salience, but also about debates that contribute to 
an ethical self-understanding amongst Europeans (Kantner, 2006). This relates to a normative 
function of the public sphere for the development of political community and solidarity to 
sustain EU democracy (Habermas, 2001). Going beyond questions of visibility, Risse (2010, 
p. 133-139) thus adds the importance of discussions that are based on ‘similar frames of 
reference and interpretation’. These ‘same criteria of relevance’ require agreement on a 
particular problem or at least the ‘potential interpretations of the problems’ (p. 119). Whether 
Brexit can contribute to the Europeanisation of public spheres therefore depends not just on 
the issue and European actors being visible in the media but also on whether there are 
transnational interpretations of Brexit that contribute to the perception of a shared community 
of Europeans. 
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Scholars are divided on the implications of a politicisation of the EU. On the one 
hand, an increase in communication about Euroscepticism can promote further 
Europeanisation by helping to develop a European democratic public (e.g. Follesdal and Hix, 
2006). For instance, de Wilde and Trenz (2012) claim that it can contribute to the EU’s 
democratic legitimacy by generating public debate about the course of European integration. 
Europeanisation of national public spheres can therefore also be promoted through the 
appearance of ‘dissenting voices’ (FitzGibbon et al, 2017), particularly media coverage of 
non-domestic Eurosceptic actors, as they contribute to the visibility of European issues 
(Gattermann and Vasilopoulou, 2017). These voices may then spark defence of the European 
project through common European frames. 
On the other hand, several scholars argue that politicisation reinforces conflicts in 
Europe. For example, Hooghe and Marks (2009) argue that politicisation of the EU relates not 
simply to a left/right conflict but is also shaped by inclusive and exclusive notions of national 
identity. With regards to media, Galpin and Trenz (2017) argue that the negativity bias 
already established in political news is often amplified in reporting of the EU which can drive 
support for Eurosceptic parties. Europeanisation of public spheres can therefore lead to what 
Gattermann and Vasilopoulou (2017) have called a ‘Eurosceptic public sphere’, in which 
populist politicians such as Le Pen and Wilders present a shared understanding of their take 
on European integration. Brexit could therefore lead to Europeanisation that is not necessarily 
positive for the EU, by increasing the presence of Eurosceptic actors, shared criticisms of the 
integration project and divisions between member states. 
 In this respect, we look for shared interpretations of Brexit by identifying different 
public sphere dynamics triggered by Brexit debates. We define a transnational frame as one 
which reflects concerns or interests shared beyond the national level. As Trenz (2008, p. 278) 
argues, Europeanisation ‘can be analysed as a process that enlarges the scope of public 
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discourse beyond the territorial nation state’. We are interested in the development of ‘an 
interpretive space in which meaning structures converge, common standpoints are crystallised 
and a collective self develops’ (p. 277). 
This suggests a number of possible findings. Firstly, Brexit debates may have no 
transnational dimension, highlighting instead interpretations rooted in the national sphere 
(Statham and Trenz, 2013, p. 57). This would signify a renationalising of the debate, in which 
Brexit sparks a re-focus on national issues. Secondly, Brexit debates may reveal transnational 
frames that support the European integration project. This would signify a Europeanisation of 
the debate, emphasising commonalities, shared values and the strive for a common future 
(Kantner, 2006, p. 513). Thirdly, they might include transnational frames that demonstrate a 
common understanding of the flaws of the integration project. In the latter, Europeanisation 
can transform into a Eurosceptic Europeanisation that leads to common delegitimisation of 
the EU. These transnational frames may be confrontational, as collective identities often 
develop through conflict (p. 516). This would pitch, for instance, ‘we’ (the Europeans) against 
‘them’ (the UK). 
 
Research design 
 
Euroscepticism has become an increasingly embedded phenomenon since the early 1990s. 
Yet, research has long been confined to issues related to party politics and public opinion, and 
has only recently been expanded to issues such as transnational politics and media (e.g. 
Caiani and Guerra, 2017; FitzGibbon et al, 2017). As Euroscepticism is often not about the 
outright rejection of the EU, but rather about putting forward a different kind of Europe, one 
approach has been to develop a spectrum of attitudes towards the EU. For instance, Startin 
(2015, p. 321) distinguishes between ‘Euro-positive’, ‘Eurosceptic’ and ‘Euro-ambivalent’ 
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newspapers, whereas Bijsmans (2017) distinguishes between ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ Eurosceptic 
positions, as well as ‘supportive’ and ‘Euroalternative’ positions.  
While we also consider Euroscepticism a diverse phenomenon, such spectrums will 
not tell us much about shared meanings and interpretations. Instead, we are interested in how 
discourse reflects a specific view on reality (e.g. Hardy et al, 2004; Semetko and Valkenburg, 
2000). We look for shared meanings through a qualitative framing approach. In this context, 
framing essentially concerns the way in which a theme is laid out ‘to promote a particular 
problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation 
for the item described’ (Entman, 1993, p. 52). Building on the work of Leconte (2010) and 
Sørensen (2008), we look at what we call ‘sources’ of Euroscepticism to identify 
transnational interpretations of the Brexit debate. Leconte distinguishes between four main 
‘varieties’ of Euroscepticism: utilitarian, political, value-based, and cultural anti-
Europeanism. Sørensen’s four ‘types’ of Euroscepticism concern issues related to economy, 
sovereignty, democracy and politics. 
Taking into account these perspectives, we analysed mediated debates in the Dutch, 
French and German public spheres by looking at four sources (integration, identity & values, 
history, and utilitarianism), eventually adding a fifth one (democracy & sovereignty). We use 
these five sources of Euroscepticism (Table 1) as a starting point to identify areas of shared 
meaning in the context of the Brexit debate, which is followed by inductive generation of sub-
frames. De Wilde and Trenz (2012, p. 539) argue that Eurosceptic discourse unfolds ‘as the 
counterpart of EU legitimation discourse’. Linked to each of these sources of Euroscepticism, 
then, we also expect to identify pro-European arguments (cf. Entman, 1993).  
 
[TABLE 1 HERE] 
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In addition, we categorise our findings along three dimensions to help us identify areas of 
common interpretation: shared British concerns, i.e. where the articles expresses agreement 
or understanding of issues raised by the UK; risk, i.e. where Brexit or calling for a referendum 
is presented as a threat or danger in terms of the aforementioned frames; and opportunity, i.e. 
where articles discuss the opportunities presented by the referendum, such as potential 
benefits to the economy. This then allows us to compare areas of shared interpretations 
between the three chosen countries. 
Our analysis looks at the ways in which the Brexit debate was framed in the public 
spheres of three of the UK’s strategic EU partners, namely France, Germany and the 
Netherlands. As mentioned before, these are also countries with influential Eurosceptic 
movements. The occurrence of Euroscepticism in British media is rather well-documented 
(e.g. Copeland and Copsey, 2017; Startin, 2015), yet the EU is also becoming increasingly 
contested in media in other countries (e.g. Bijsmans, 2017; Galpin, 2017). While a focus on 
quality newspapers may suggest a bias towards audiences that are more likely to be broadly 
supportive of the EU (see Risse, 2010), centre-right newspapers tend to be most critical 
towards the EU. Hence, we might expect that conservative-leaning newspapers find common 
ground with British Eurosceptics. We specifically look at three leading centre-right quality 
newspapers: Le Figaro (France), Die Welt (Germany) and NRC Handelsblad (the 
Netherlands). Le Figaro is the most read conservative newspaper in France. Die Welt is the 
conservative newspaper with the second highest circulation in Germany, following the 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, but far exceeds the latter in online readership. NRC 
Handelsblad is the most important Dutch centre-right quality newspaper, with an influential 
op-ed section (see Leruth et al. 2017).  
Our analysis concentrates on key events in the Brexit debate: 21 January-3 February 
2013 (Bloomberg speech) and 4-17 May 2015 (UK general election). For the campaign, we 
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looked at the period 15 February-24 June 2016 and we analysed the rest of June 2016 in order 
to assess newspapers’ immediate responses to the result. Articles were retrieved using 
LexisNexis using a combination of keywords for the first two periods and ‘Brexit’ for the 
referendum period. We included only those that referred to issues related to the renegotiation 
or referendum in the title or the first paragraph. Summaries or purely explanatory articles 
regarding various issues related to the referendum were also excluded.  
Altogether, we analysed 758 articles. As Figure 1 shows, in all three newspapers the 
referendum became highly salient in June 2016 in the run up to and aftermath of the 
referendum. This perhaps suggests that it was only when the reality of the referendum 
approached that it truly became a ‘European’ issue. But was this comparable news cycle 
matched by shared understandings of Brexit? 
 
[FIGURE 1 HERE] 
 
Analysis 
 
The Bloomberg Speech and the 2015 General Election 
 
Le Figaro 
 
In Le Figaro, articles covering the Bloomberg speech focused on its transnational 
implications for the future of the EU, framed in terms of integration. Most of these focus on 
issues related to the future of European integration as a whole. The initial reaction to the 
Bloomberg speech highlights the risks of leaving the Union, not only for the EU (in terms of 
potential disintegration) but also for the UK. The majority of articles insist on the risk of 
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‘jumping into the unknown’ (Le Figaro, 24 January 2013a), with the UK needing to gain 
support from key member states in order to secure a new membership deal. One article is 
particularly critical of David Cameron’s strategy, calling it ‘dangerous’ and ‘illusory’ (Le 
Figaro, 26 January 2013b). The newspaper also emphasises Cameron’s weak position within 
the Conservative Party, and states that he put his own political career at risk in the likes of 
Margaret Thatcher and John Major. 
The newspaper does not demonstrate much evidence of shared British concerns in 
France, but many articles deal with reactions from other countries. A couple of articles assess 
Merkel’s position, who believes that the EU should become ‘more liberal’ on issues such as 
free trade and competitiveness. Accordingly, the newspaper highlights shared British 
concerns in Germany. One article written from the perspective of Germany emphasised 
France’s potential loss of influence in an increasingly liberal Europe, and the erosion of the 
long-standing Franco-German axis. The discussion also focuses on identity & values, 
highlighting the UK’s peripheral position and the long-term ‘clash of culture’ between a 
British emphasis on national sovereignty and a pragmatic approach to European integration 
based on the French political institutions. The focus on the impact on the UK as well as 
Germany’s shared concerns suggest that Le Figaro does not reveal shared concerns about the 
EU with the UK and Germany. Yet, another opinion piece portrays the possibility of a UK 
referendum as an opportunity, addressing the potential for a ‘two-speed Union’, consisting of 
the Eurozone on the one hand and an enlarged European Economic Area on the other, is 
perceived as a viable option to meet David Cameron’s demands (Le Figaro, 24 January 
2013c). Overall, however, Cameron’s demands are met with scepticism in the French right-
wing newspaper, which does not believe that the EU needs to be reformed.  
Transnational implications of the UK referendum for ‘Europe’ were also a theme in 
coverage of the 2015 election. An opinion piece by Paris 3 Professor Pauline Schnapper 
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highlighted the so-called ‘British paradox’, as the Conservatives pledged to hold a referendum 
to potentially leave the EU while Brussels is becoming increasingly ‘British, i.e. more flexible 
and intergovernmental, with a weaker Commission’ (Le Figaro, 6 May 2015a). One editorial 
piece  offered some cautious optimism, believing that the outcome of the election favours the 
UK staying in the EU, as ‘the European question lost most of its relevance’ during the 
campaign (Le Figaro, 9 May 2015b). The theme of immigration which is perceived as a key 
issue to determine the outcome of the referendum was mentioned in two articles, especially 
with regards to the refugee crisis; yet Le Figaro did not frame the issue of immigration as a 
shared concern.  However, most of the discussion focused specifically on Cameron’s 
leadership style and how he intends to conduct negotiations in order for the UK to stay in the 
EU, despite strong opposition from Tory backbenchers and pressure from the UK 
Independence Party (UKIP). The newly appointed government is considered to be 
Eurosceptic, emphasising the prominent roles given to key Eurosceptic figures. Thus, while 
there is some transnational understanding of the referendum, in terms of risks for the EU and 
shared British concerns, Le Figaro primarily emphasises the risks of Cameron’s strategy for 
the UK.  
 
Die Welt 
 
In contrast to Le Figaro, most articles covering the Bloomberg speech in Die Welt provide 
evidence of transnationally shared British concerns. There are sympathies with Cameron’s 
demands, especially the hope that they could lead to a reformed Europe that is competitive in 
the global economy. Die Welt’s coverage reflects a similar enomomic vision in Germany and 
the UK, and Germany’s leading role as an export nation, that is contrasted strongly with 
France. One article describes the speech as a call for ‘a maritime, outward-looking Europe 
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instead of a self-absorbed continental block in the spirit of Napoleon’ (Die Welt, 25 January 
2013a). This frame emphasises the importance of the German-British relationship as a 
counterweight to the Franco-German relationship, which is seen as in decline. One article 
maintains that France ‘is drifting geographically into the south of the EU, while the push for 
reforms is coming from the north of the EU, including England’ (Die Welt, 31 January 
2013b). The UK is viewed as a key partner in economic policy, sharing similar ideas about 
competitiveness and liberal economic reforms. Articles also often discuss a democratic deficit 
in the EU, as well as agree that there needs to be reform of political union, clarity on 
subsidiarity and greater transparency. Cameron’s speech therefore finds resonance in Die Welt 
in terms of similar concerns about democracy and subsidiarity in the EU. 
However, while there is much sympathy with Cameron’s demands and visions for the 
EU, authors often suggest that by demanding such reforms, he is trying to ‘save Europe’. This 
suggests a solid commitment to European integration not necessarily matched in British 
conservative newspapers. Furthermore, there is concern about the risk of Cameron’s plans, 
with references by then Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle and then President of the 
European Parliament Martin Schulz to Goethe’s Zauberlehrling, describing Cameron as a 
Sorcerer’s Apprentice who risks unleashing forces that he will not be able to control. Overall, 
Cameron’s Bloomberg speech is received by Die Welt as a welcome call for reform, 
suggesting a willingness amongst German conservatives to negotiate with Cameron.  
The German newspaper’s interpretations of the Conservative win in the 2015 election 
are mixed. Firstly, as in 2013, some articles reflect shared British concerns. One commentary 
expresses optimism as the ‘Britons do not want an all-powerful Brussels, a fiscal union, or a 
softening of austerity […] thankfully’ (Die Welt, 9 May 2015a). This article shares Britain’s 
strive for a more competitive European economy and opposition to a federal EU. Some 
articles identify areas of common concern in terms of European integration and European 
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democracy. However, the utilitarian and integration frames also highlight risks to the EU and 
UK. One article raises concerns about contagion to other countries with right-wing populist 
movements. However, there is also focus on national implications for the UK economy, 
highlighting implications of the referendum for the UK’s economic growth or the uncertainty 
it was likely to cause on the markets. Nevertheless, there is a clear ambivalence – while it is 
pointed out that the UK economy is less dependent on Europe than the German economy, 
articles also reveal confidence that the UK will ultimately vote to remain. Altogether, as in Le 
Figaro and NRC Handelsblad, the reaction to the election is relatively muted. During these 
periods there is a transnational dimension in terms of shared British concerns as well as 
concerns about the wider EU, but also a clear focus on the national implications of the 
uncertainty for the UK alone. 
 
NRC Handelsblad 
 
In NRC Handelsblad Cameron’s Bloomberg speech and the prospective of a possible Brexit 
are predominantly framed in terms of integration, in a debate that clearly has a transnational 
dimension, reflecting common interests between member states. Shared British concerns 
particularly relate to the need to limit EU legislation. The Netherlands is certainly not 
unwilling to think along these lines and discussing competences is also not something that is 
refuted outright. As in Die Welt, this reflects commonalities between the UK and the 
Netherlands, particularly their histories as maritime trading nations. Correspondent Caroline 
de Gruyter notes that many countries are actually willing to give in somewhat, as they value 
British EU membership (NRC Handelsblad, 23  January 2013a). Initial reactions in Germany 
are also reported as being relatively positive. The utilitarian and democracy & sovereignty 
frames also appear through references to Cameron’s emphasis on the benefits of the internal 
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market and his criticism of the gap between the EU and its citizens. British membership of the 
internal market is seen as vital, also for the Netherlands. In the words of Dutch Prime 
Minister Mark Rutte, the UK is ‘growth-oriented’ in contrast to policymakers in Brussels 
(NRC Handelsblad, 26 January 2013c). There are occasional references to opportunities, with 
Cameron’s speech offering a chance to reform the EU. However, opportunities are mostly 
seen by populist politicians, such as Geert Wilders who calls for a Dutch membership 
referendum. 
Despite these shared concerns, and similarly to Le Figaro, there is also extensive 
reference to the risks emanating from Cameron’s proposals. Like France, the Netherlands was 
at the time also facing strong populist challenges. References to risks tend to follow the line 
that Europe must stay united and should not be downgraded to a cherry-picking project. The 
general view is that a referendum will be a guaranteed loss for Europe, with Brexit seen as 
jeopardising national, European and global economies. Generally, it is noted that European 
cooperation should be cherished, otherwise European values and solidarity could be at risk. 
There is reference to Europe’s past when asked what a British exit would mean for the 
continent, as it may lead to destabilisation, whereas European integration has brought peace. 
German Minister of Foreign Affairs Guido Westerwelle is quoted as having referred to 
Europe as a Schicksalsgemeinschaft (community of fate) (NRC Handelsblad, 24  January 
2013b).  
The surprise win by the Tories at the 2015 General Election is seen as the starting 
point of the debate about British EU membership. Integration is the dominant theme, while 
other frames only occur infrequently. As in both Le Figaro and Die Welt, coverage focuses on 
the national implications for the UK, with some reflections from the Dutch perspective and 
only few insights from elsewhere. Nevertheless, there are some references to shared British 
concerns in the guise of the need to reform the EU. In an editorial, NRC Handelsblad (9 May 
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2015a) stresses that Britain and the EU need each other and that Cameron’s surprise win 
offers an opportunity for swift negotiations. Overall, UK membership is seen as important for 
the Netherlands as well as for the rest of Europe, both in terms of economy and politics. Yet, 
transnational risks are raised too, especially regarding the need to maintain unity in light of 
global challenges and the potential economic consequences of a Brexit. Columnists question 
the extent to which there are shared views on what a better EU entails, with one even noting 
that British and Dutch views are not as similar as often suggested (NRC Handelsblad, 15 May 
2015b). 
 
The Referendum Campaign and its Aftermath 
 
Le Figaro 
 
The referendum campaign was extensively covered in Le Figaro. Many articles were framed 
in terms of utilitarianism, mostly from the perspective of the UK, thus not indicating 
transnationally shared meanings. Among these, most of them emphasised that the economic 
risks of leaving the EU, which are perceived as catastrophic for the UK as it could face a 
period of recession, lose jobs and damage the British banking sector. Yet, a couple of articles 
covered the debate over the potential economic opportunities discussed in the UK in the case 
of a Brexit, as advocated by prominent Leave supporters: EU membership fees, which could 
be used to invest in national infrastructure (though the newspaper insists that membership 
figures used do not take in consideration the British rebate); the UK’s dynamic economy 
which could benefit from further free trade agreements; and the opportunity to create jobs 
especially within the City. In addition, many articles further highlighted political risks of 
leaving the EU for the UK at the domestic level, covering issues such as the relationship with 
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Ireland, a potential second Scottish independence referendum and the weakening influence of 
David Cameron within his own political party.   
However, much of the discussion did demonstrate a transnational dimension, through 
a focus on the transnational risks of such referendum for the future of European integration. 
The risk of a ‘domino effect’ was often mentioned, with articles focusing on the rise of 
Eurosceptic movements across Europe as well as on the risks of holding referendums which 
can be used as a political tool to weaken the EU. The lack of a ‘plan B’ in the case of a 
victory of the ‘Leave’ vote is also often criticised, as this would lead to a period of political 
instability both for the UK and the EU. Yet, some articles framed Brexit in terms of 
opportunities, outlining that it could have a positive impact over the future of European 
integration. These articles either advocate ‘more Europe’ based on a federal model of 
integration (Le Figaro, 16 June 2016a) or calling Brexit ‘a chance for the EU’, which could 
lead to a wave of reforms to create a ‘Confederal Europe’ (Le Figaro, 19 April 2016b). 
The outcome of the Brexit referendum is extensively discussed in Le Figaro, 
especially compared to the two other newspapers included in this analysis (see Figure 1). 
Again, there is discussion of both the transnational and national implications of the result. In 
general, articles tend to cover three negative impacts of the vote – these are framed in terms of 
risks. Firstly, the uncertainty surrounding the EU’s future is extensively discussed. According 
to the newspaper, the vote means that the European continent is now facing a deep and 
unprecedented political (and potentially economic) crisis. Many articles emphasise the need 
for the 27 other member states to find a fast common answer to avoid a risk of contagion.  
The newspaper also emphasised the lack of solutions proposed by European leaders to 
relaunch the European integration project; the absence of a Franco-German proposal is 
heavily criticised. One editorial emphasises the needs for deep political reforms, but also 
criticises the lack of a ‘plan B’. 
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Secondly, however, several articles published within the week following the vote 
focused on the national consequences of the Brexit vote for the UK, mostly on the British 
economy. There seems to be a broad consensus that the vote will mostly harm the UK and 
create major political uncertainties, which could ultimately lead to another Scottish 
independence referendum. Thirdly, domestic reactions are also covered quite extensively, 
again renationalising the debate to focus on France: one article predicts that a ‘Frexit’ 
referendum will be a key aspect of the 2017 presidential election, while others emphasise the 
divisions within the two mainstream political parties (the Socialist Party and the Republicans) 
over the consequences of Brexit for the influence of France in the EU. The relations between 
France and the UK are also questioned, especially with regards to the Touquet Agreement 
regarding asylum seekers. Finally, despite the broadly negative reaction to Brexit, a few 
articles highlight potential opportunities for France, as the British people’s decision could 
have a positive impact on the French economy by attracting London-based companies in Paris 
and by strengthening the ties between France and the United States.   
 
Die Welt 
 
In Die Welt, the coverage also shifted in 2016 to focus much more on the transnational risks 
of Brexit to integration and the economy. Similarly to Le Figaro, there is a sense that the EU 
is facing a severe existential crisis. One article states that ‘the EU will be shaken to its very 
foundations’ (Die Welt, 31 May 2016a). The concern is often related to worries about growing 
populist movements across Europe, as Brexit could spark a ‘domino effect’ – a concern 
shared in both France and the Netherlands. There is also discussion about the value of 
referendums, which journalists argue allow populist politicians to work outside the 
framework of normal representative institutions. Nevertheless, some articles also discuss 
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opportunities for Germany and the rest of Europe, sometimes viewed as a opportunity for 
reform or further integration. Economically, London future as a financial centre is repeatedly 
questioned as ‘financial institutions in Frankfurt, Paris or Zurich will gladly offer to inherit 
their British competitors’ business’ (Die Welt, 15 June 2016d). 
 Some articles, however, highlight shared British concerns. Firstly, many reiterate 
Germany’s shared interest in pursuing EU reforms, and the North/South divide again emerges 
through a common vision of a liberal and competitive Europe. The UK is still seen as a 
neoliberal ally for Germany not just in economic matters but also in preventing deeper 
European integration. There are also shared concerns in terms of EU democracy, for example, 
Euroscepticism is blamed on those who have supported deeper integration. These shared 
British concerns thus call for reforms of the EU or a reorientation of the EU’s goals. 
There is nevertheless some attention to national implications of the referendum. The 
potential risks to the British economy are highlighted, such as overall projected losses to the 
GDP. Some articles also focus on the impact on London as a Finanzstandort, as well as a 
predicted loss of jobs. Some attention is also paid to the likely economic impact on Germany, 
such as on small and medium-sized businesses. Finally, identity & values and history are also 
raised, with the UK framed as inherently ‘different’ to the rest of Europe. One article, for 
example, describes a nostalgic middle England that ‘wishes the old England back, an England 
that possessed a global Empire’ (Die Welt, 23 June 2016f), while another notes that ‘the Brits 
bear a deep mistrust of the central European tradition of consensus’ (Die Welt, 10 June 
2016g).  
After the vote, a number of articles discuss the need to maintain unity in the EU, 
particularly with regards to the response by EU leaders who endeavour to ‘protect the unity of 
the 27’. This determination to maintain unity separates the EU’s future from the UK’s much 
before Brexit effectively happens, as it ‘forces the remaining EU partners to […] design a new 
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future strategy for Europe’ (Die Welt, 30 June 2016i). There are also concerns that Brexit will 
leave Germany in a too-powerful position in Europe. One article notes that the German 
government will want to keep the UK in the EU to avoid ‘growing aversion to them 
supposedly as the only big power in the club (Die Welt, 30 June 2016j). As during the 
campaign, there is some attention to the opportunities that Brexit might offer, with calls for 
deeper integration in areas such as economic and monetary union and foreign and security 
policy.  
In addition to risks of Brexit to European integration, some post-referendum articles 
discuss the result in utilitarian terms. On the one hand, the risks to the European economy are 
seen as potentially disastrous. Unlike Le Figaro, which primarily discussed the economic 
risks to the UK, the main fear in Die Welt is the likely destabilising effect of Brexit on the 
Euro. Brexit is compared with previous economic shocks amid concerns that Brexit could 
cause a ‘black Friday’ on the financial markets. The concerns also involve fears that the Euro 
could break up altogether as the European economy is still seen as highly vulnerable to 
another global crisis. However, there is also discussion of national implications, such as the 
view that the economic effects will be tempered by the stability of the German economy, or, 
like in Le Figaro, the opportunities of Brexit, which suggest a sense that Brexit could help 
strengthen Germany’s economic identity as Standort Deutschland. Furthermore, British 
difference is again mentioned by explaining  the vote through Britain’s ‘maritime history’, 
which forms British identity. 
  
NRC Handelsblad 
 
In NRC Handelsblad integration still plays an important role, but so do other frames, 
particularly utilitarianism, and they are often discussed in a transnational perspective. Initially 
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the focus is still very much on the deal between David Cameron and the other European 
leaders. While proponents of Brexit such as Boris Johnson reject the deal as being insufficient 
and some academics and former politicians warn that it is unclear how parts of it will actually 
work in practice, the coverage in NRC Handelsblad initially reflects a shared understanding 
of a deal that is important for European unity, even though further reform may be needed in 
the future. Once again the strong ties between Britain and the Netherlands are stressed 
throughout. Generally, Britain is described as being intrinsically linked to Europe and 
stronger when part of it. 
Yet, as in Die Welt during this period, such considerations soon give way to 
reflections on the risk to the integration process of the upcoming referendum, which could 
lead to a process of gradual disintegration. In this context, Europe’s recent history is also 
portrayed as one of peace and stability due to European integration; Brexit may cause new 
instability. Brexit is also seen as a risk for national, European and global economies. The 
general argument throughout does not focus on the benefits of membership, but rather on the 
risks of not being a member. In contrast to Le Figaro, which discusses the opportunities for 
France, Brexit is sometimes discussed in terms of opportunities for European integration. A 
few opinion pieces perceive Brexit as a chance to redefine or deepen European integration, 
and it is noted that banks might relocate to Amsterdam or other European cities.  
However, the referendum is also discussed in a national perspective. For example, 
immigration is framed in different ways: as an issue of integration (the UK not being a 
member of Schengen), but also partly in terms of identity & values (outside influences that 
threatened British values) and a matter of national sovereignty (the need to regain control of 
British borders). British supporters of Brexit, often through emphasising British 
exceptionalism and national identity, stress the opportunities of a Brexit. References to 
regaining control over British borders and taking back control from unelected bureaucrats are 
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abundant. This rhetoric is also picked up by Le Pen and Wilders, who hope for, respectively, 
‘Frexit’ and ‘Nexit’ referendums, which NRC Handelsblad describes as being risky and 
unwise. This focus again reflects domestic pressures from the Party for Freedom, and matches 
similar concerns in Germany and France about a ‘domino effect’across Europe.  
The day after the referendum NRC Handelsblad (24 June 2016a) calls the outcome a 
‘leap in the dark’. The transnational risks associated with Brexit are prominent throughout 
NRC Handelsblad’s coverage– often phrased in terms of uncertainty. This uncertainty 
concerns the future of the EU and the need to maintain unity, but also relates to possible 
repercussions of Brexit for the economy. Post-war peace is also discussed in terms of 
Germany’s position in Europe and peace in Northern Ireland. At times the emphasis on unity 
is contrasted with the lack of plans and the general feeling of disarray in the UK. The 
referendum is described as a wake-up call for the EU, suggesting shared concerns. EU leaders 
argue that the gap between the EU and its citizens needs to be closed by democratic reforms, 
yet NRC Handelsblad notes the absence of concrete plans and the many ad-hoc meetings 
rather give a disunited impression. Berlin believes that further integration may currently not 
be opportune, while French politicians rather talk in terms of the EU focussing on a number 
of key areas. Reactions in the Netherlands follow similar lines, once again stressing British-
Dutch relations. 
Regarding national implications, identity & values are discussed from the perspective 
of UK immigration, a key reason why many people voted against EU membership. The fact 
that Northern Ireland and Scotland voted in favour of EU membership adds additional 
insecurity, as it raises questions about British unity. Opportunities of Brexit are again mostly 
discussed from the perspective of those who see an end to European integration as a good 
thing. ‘Taking back control’ and regaining national sovereignty are identified as key reasons 
for Brexit, with the economic case for EU membership made by the Remain camp not seen as 
 22 
sufficiently convincing. The day after the referendum Nigel Farage refers to ‘independence 
day’ and hopes that Brexit will be a first step towards a ‘Europe of sovereign nations’ (NRC 
Handelsblad, 24 June 2016b). Fellow populist leaders, such as Le Pen and Wilders, echo 
these sentiments and call for referendums in their own countries and elsewhere. 
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Discussion and conclusions 
 
As Menon and Salter (2016, p. 1318) write, the Brexit referendum is ‘a turning-point in the 
history of both Britain and the EU’. The analysis presented above reveals that, from David 
Cameron’s Bloomberg speech to the immediate aftermath of the referendum, the potentially 
historic outcome of the process was acknowledged by all three newspapers. A concise 
overview of how the debate developed is depicted in Figure 2. 
 
[FIGURE 2 HERE] 
 
Two sets of conclusions, relating to the spatial and temporal dimensions of Brexit, can be 
drawn from our analysis. Firstly, while the newspapers do discuss the national implications of 
the referendum for their own countries and for the UK, we find a clear transnational 
dimension in the meanings given to ‘Brexit’. Media coverage about a country’s EU 
membership can promote a Europeanisation of debates based on an ethical self-understanding 
that emphasises shared values and a common future. In particular, this stems from a concern 
about Eurosceptic parties in all three countries. This concern drives a reassertion of the 
importance of European cooperation and solidarity.  
 However, we do also find evidence of shared British concerns about the EU, 
particularly in the German and Dutch newspapers prior to the referendum campaign, which 
reflect transnational challenges to the EU’s democratic legitimacy and institutional set-up. 
Such shared concerns reflect similar economic visions and attitudes to sovereignty amongst 
conservative actors in Germany, the Netherlands and the UK, and contrast strongly with 
France. Both NRC Handelsblad and Die Welt gave considerable importance to the Dutch-
British and German-British relationships and identify with Britain as a proponent of a liberal 
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market economic model as part of a ‘Northern’ European political culture. Here, British 
attempts to reform the EU find resonance transnationally and spark calls for reforms to the 
EU’s structures. In this sense, we see evidence of a ‘Eurocritical’ (Statham and Trenz, 2013) 
identity based on shared values and constructed in conflict with the EU itself. Brexit thus 
clearly demonstrates the way in which public debates about the EU translate into a form of 
transnational polity contestation that challenges the EU in fundamental terms (de Wilde and 
Trenz, 2012).  
Secondly, this paper sheds light on the temporal evolution of the debate on Brexit.  
During the pre-referendum period, there were degrees of support in NRC Handelsblad and 
Die Welt. However, by 2016, all three newspapers become highly critical of the strategy 
pursued by the British Prime Minister, which is perceived as putting the EU’s future at risk. 
This might be explained by the fact that, by this point, a referendum had been officially 
announced and was no longer merely a ‘renegotiation’ of the UK’s membership. Brexit is 
perceived as a threat to the cohesion of the EU, with possible negative repercussions for 
economic development and the peace that has characterised European integration. Both Le 
Figaro and Die Welt also give some coverage to the economic and political opportunities 
presented by Brexit. The fact that all three newspapers also extensively cover the likely 
negative implications for the UK, rather than the EU, suggest that they view Brexit more as 
an act of self-harm for the UK. This suggests that the debate could evolve towards a more 
optimistic approach for the EU 27. In sum, the post-referendum discussion evolved in all 
three countries to be collectively framed as ‘us’, Europeans, versus ‘them’, the Brits.  
 There are a number of implications of this research. On the one hand, we see 
that there are likely unintended consequences of Brexit for the UK which raises questions 
about the degree of flexibility that the EU27 will adopt with regard to forthcoming exit 
negotiations. While there was considerable support for Cameron’s demands in his Bloomberg 
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speech in the Dutch and German newspapers, the referendum itself strengthened the resolve 
to protect the unity of the EU 27. Indeed, since the beginning of the Article 50 negotiations, it 
has become clear that the EU member states are highly united in their commitment to protect 
the EU. Holding the referendum was thus likely counter-productive to promoting the UK’s 
interests. This echoes Adler-Nissen’s (2014) finding that British and Danish opt-outs actually 
promote European integration through the perception of a threat to European unity. This 
might result in the UK experiencing difficulties achieving its objectives as it leaves the EU 
(cf. Oliver, 2016).  
 On the other hand, the Brexit debate reveals emerging coalitions in the EU which 
might create further difficulties for the EU-27. Before 2016, the Dutch and German 
newspapers often emphasised the importance of their relations with the UK, suggesting a 
willingness to remain close partners of the UK outside the framework of the EU. The 
possibility of ‘Eurosceptic’ coalitions between leaders of Eurosceptic parties or, for example, 
the Visegrad states might also emerge that lend support to the UK’s position. Recent 
developments, such as the relatively poor electoral performance of Eurosceptic movements in 
the three countries and the election of Emmanuel Macron as French President, would, 
however, suggest that the UK is becoming increasingly isolated, with many EU27 countries 
starting to focus on the opportunities raised by the Brexit vote for the future of European 
integration. 
 
Words: 7, 375 (without references and footnote with acknowledgments) 
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Table 1: Sources of Euroscepticism 
Source Explanation 
Integration Issues related to more integration versus less integration; increasing or 
decreasing EU competences; polity issues. 
Democracy & 
Sovereignty 
Issues related to the EU’s ‘democratic deficit’ and how to bring the EU 
closer to its citizens; issues related to national sovereignty and decision-
making (who is in control). 
Identity & 
Values 
Issues related to identity (EU vs. national identity) and to rights and 
beliefs (e.g. human rights, citizenship rights, freedom of movement). 
History Issues concerning Europe’s past, present and future; relatively peaceful 
since the end of World War II, but a continent of countries with diverse 
histories. 
Utilitarianism Issues concerning the (economic) costs and benefits of European 
integration.  
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Figure 1: Number of analysed articles over time 
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Figure 2: How the debate developed* 
 
* Abbreviations refer to the frames integration (I), utilitarianism (U), history (H), democracy & sovereignty (D&S), identity & values (I&S). 
Bloomsberg Speech 
Le Figaro 
Mostly I and U, risks to 
UK and EU, no support 
for referendum strategy, 
loss of French influence 
Die Welt  
Mostly I and D&S, some 
H, support for British 
perspective and UK-DE 
relationship 
NRC Handelsblad 
Mostly I, also U, cautious 
support for Cameron,  
need to maitain unity, NL-
UK relationship 
General Elections 
Le Figaro 
Mostly I and D&S, 
cautious optimism over 
referendum outcome  
Die Welt 
I, D&S and U, support for 
reforms, but risks to 
integration and economy 
NRC Handelsblad 
Mostly I, also U - 
cautious support for 
reforms, need to maitain 
unity, NL-UK relationship 
Referendum Campaign 
Le Figaro 
Mostly U and I, political 
and economic risks of 
Brexit, but also 
opportunities for Europe 
Die Welt 
All frames, mostly risk to 
integration, EU/UK 
economies, Britain seen 
as 'different' 
NRC Handelsblad 
More diverse frames,  
political and economic 
risks of Brexit, UK 
belongs to Europe 
Immediate Aftermath 
Le Figaro 
Mostly I and U, political 
and economic uncertainty, 
EU27 needs to maintain 
unity vs UK 
Die Welt 
All frames, mostly risk to 
EU, need to maintain 
unity, also opportunities 
for EU  
NRC Handelsblad 
Mostly I and U, political 
and economic uncertainty, 
EU27 needs to maintain 
unity vs UK 
